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v“When solving a problem of interest, do not solve a more
general problem as an intermediate step. Try to get the answer
that you need, but not a more general one. It is quite possible
that you have enough information to solve a particular problem
of interest well, but not enough information to solve a general
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- Vladimir Vapnik
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Abstract
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) combine information technology
with operation technology to monitor or control physical industrial
processes via computer-based programs and often operate on critical
infrastructures. As such, compromised or maliciously operated ICS
can cause devastating consequences on society at large. To meet
efficiency requirements, ICS are becoming increasingly connected to
corporate networks and to the Internet, thereby elevating the risk
of cyberattacks. Resilient and sustainable highly connected ICS
therefore require a serious consideration of proper security measures.
Securing ICS solely from an IT perspective, while necessary, proves
insufficient because, at the physical layer, the critical process would
remain unmonitored and therefore vulnerable to sabotage by the
attackers.
The recent years have witnessed an increased interest in process-
level intrusion detection where the process network connecting
field devices is monitored for malicious behavior. One prominent
approach in the literature proposes to build a model of the physical
process, which is then used to compare a predicted state with the
actual state in the hope of identifying attacks. Building and using
a predictive model of the physical process, however, is non trivial,
domain specific, and prone to detection inaccuracies due to noise
in the process data.
This thesis introduces a novel model-free approach to detecting
cyberattacks on ICS by monitoring the process network in real time
and deciding when the system operation is departing from normal
dynamics. The proposed process-aware stealthy-attack detection
mechanism processes raw sensor measurements to capture the dy-
namics of the underlying control system during a training phase,
and then during a detection phase, it measures the extent to which
current sensor observations conform with the estimated dynamics.
The thesis provides a comprehensive treatment of the introduced
method by thoroughly discussing its theoretical basis, proving its
efficacy through extensive experiments on various systems, and,
finally, demonstrating its applicability to real environments.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection; Industrial Control Systems; Singu-
lar Spectrum Analysis; Stealthy Attacks; Departure Detection
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1
Introduction
“Imagination is more important than knowledge.”
– Albert Einstein
Nowadays, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are everywhere. Soci-
eties are becoming growingly dependent on critical infrastructure
operated by these types of systems and industries are heading
towards increased connectivity to scale and meet efficiency require-
ments [1]. Leveraging advances in information and communication
technologies is paving the way for unprecedented efficacy and flex-
ibility of operation. Connectivity and digitalization of control
systems, however, open doors to malicious actors with high mo-
tivation and resources to remotely compromise these historically
isolated systems [2].
It is no understatement to say that the risk accompanying the
rapidly growing connectivity trend in ICS is alarming, as threats
to critical infrastructures on which normal societal functioning
depends are worryingly escalating. Unlike attacks on IT systems
that are often bounded by virtual impact, attacks on ICS are
more serious because they can cause physical damage to critical
infrastructures [3–9], potentially leading to loss of human lives or
large-scale infrastructural chaos [10]. The need to secure these
systems is unquestionable and efforts to secure them are increasing,
albeit at a relatively modest pace in light of the scale and nature
of the looming threats.
3
4 1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the distinctive nature of ICS systems, traditional IT-
based security mechanisms are often inapplicable, hence many
attempts to detect attacks via direct application of off-the-shelf
techniques are doomed to fall short. One approach that has proven
viable in recent years proposes to monitor the process-level network
connecting field devices to detect intrusions [11–17]. State-of-the-art
methods, however, have limitations: they involve building complex
models as an intermediate step and are mostly domain-specific.
A model-free approach that is tailored to the ICS environment is
therefore highly desirable.
This thesis presents a novel model-free data-driven detection
method that is theoretically sound, efficient, practical, and widely
applicable. We present a comprehensive treatment of our pro-
posed solution, named pasad, which is tailored to cyber-physical
systems [18]. In addition, as deploying process-level Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS) in real ICS environments is still an unexplored
territory, we discuss how, based on empirical evidence from real-
world experiments, pasad is sufficiently lightweight and fairly easy
to deploy on limited-resource hardware [19].
1.1 Scope
The recent proliferation of cyber-physical systems has been accom-
panied with an ever expanding attack surface. As such, a firm
security approach requires the consideration of the various threats
and attack vectors. Notwithstanding the importance of preventing
attacks on such critical systems, this thesis attempts to treat the
problem of detecting potential attacks on ICS infrastructure and
raising an alert upon detection of suspicious behavior.
While the proposed IDS is generally applicable to various kinds
of cyber-physical systems, the focus of this thesis is on the ICS
subset. Furthermore, while different subsystems may be monitored
for intrusions, pasad operates on the process-level network where
the communication between field devices is monitored.
Finally, even at the process level, different data types may
be used as input to the IDS. In this work, we consider sensor
measurements generated by physical processes to detect deviations
in the system behavior. By only requiring to process time series of
raw sensor measurements to make decisions on the system’s current
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state, thereby dismissing the need for system-dependent features,
pasad proves applicable to a wide range of cyber-physical systems.
1.2 Outline
In the remainder of this chapter, we present background mate-
rial, highlight the problem of increasing security threats to critical
infrastructure, and introduce the concept of process-level attack
detection. We conclude this chapter with research questions, our
contributions, and future directions.
In Chapter 2, we present Paper A—“Truth Will Out: Departure-
Based Process-Level Detection of Stealthy Attacks on Control Sys-
tems”, in which we present pasad, a Process-Aware Stealthy-Attack
Detection mechanism that monitors the process network in ICS
and detects structural changes in the behavior of the underlying
physical process.
Finally, in Chapter 3, we present Paper B—“The Nuts and Bolts
of Deploying Process-Level IDS in Industrial Control Systems”, in
which we discuss our experience and the lessons we learned from
deploying an IDS prototype in a real environment.
1.3 Industrial Control Systems
Industrial control systems are cyber-physical systems that enable
communication between field devices (actuators and sensors) and
controllers in a closed loop fashion to control a physical process
(see Figure 1.1). Abstractly considered, closed-loop control systems
involve sensors that sense some physical property from the controlled
process and communicate the measurements to a controller. Based
on the received sensor measurements and on the implemented
control logic, controllers send commands to actuators that directly
manipulate the physical process to maintain a desired state of
operation [1]. The controlled physical process is often sophisticated,
cost-sensitive, and high-precision, and ICS are typically found in
safety-critical environments. No matter if it is due to failure or
malicious acts, undesired changes in the dynamics of these systems
may prove highly costly and it is imperative that proper mechanisms
are in place to detect them.
6 1. INTRODUCTION
Physical Process SensorsActuators
Controller
Figure 1.1: An abstract architecture of Industrial Control Systems.
1.4 Imminent Threats to Critical Infrastruc-
tures
Controllable “smart” devices are invading our societies. Through
digitalization and inter-connectivity, the Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT) is transforming our critical infrastructure and re-
shaping the cyber landscape into one with much higher destructive
potential [10]. The rapidly developing trend of digitalization and
connectivity is posing imminent threats to critical infrastructure
on which societies highly depend; including health care, transporta-
tion, manufacturing, and power distribution to name a few. The
recent years have witnessed allegedly state-sponsored cyberattacks
suggesting that cyber warfare is looming in the horizon [3, 4, 8, 9].
Unfortunately, the need for meeting efficiency requirements and
enabling more controllability and interfacing with industrial assets
is overshadowing the thought of resilient and sustainable modern-
ized infrastructure, and cyber adversaries are becoming ever more
capable in the process.
Being a double-edge sword, inasmuch as connectivity is increas-
ing industrial efficiency, it is rendering critical systems increasingly
vulnerable by introducing single points of failures into systems
with high availability and reliability requirements. As a result,
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure have potential to throw en-
tire communities into chaos, causing large-scale and far-reaching
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consequences on society at large. For instance, a cyberattack on a
nation’s power grid, which could be launched from anywhere in the
world, has been shown capable of depriving thousands of households
and facilities of electricity [20].
1.5 Intrusion Detection Systems for ICS
In response to the rising cyber threats in critical infrastructure,
considerable effort has recently been devoted by the research commu-
nity to investigating proper defensive measures. Designing intrusion
detection systems suitable for cyber-physical environments has been
at the forefront of this effort.
1.5.1 Motivation
It comes as no surprise that IDSs are considered as an important
piece of the puzzle since one indispensable step in combating adver-
sarial acts in ICS, or any information system for that matter, is in
fact detecting the presence of the attacker.
Intrusion detection has its academic roots in the 1987 work
by Denning [21] and has been extensively studied in the context of
typical IT systems ever since. In a broad sense, intrusion detection
is divided into two main categories: misuse detection and anomaly
detection [22]. In misuse detection, traffic patterns that match with
predefined so-called attack signatures are flagged as anomalous
while all other traffic is considered normal. By contrast, anomaly
detection involves creating a baseline from traffic data defining the
normal behavior such that all other traffic that deviates from the
baseline is considered anomalous.
Defining attack signatures in ICS environments is tricky due to
the attacks on ICS being rare, specialized, and targeted at complex
system components that are often legacy and proprietary. On
the other hand, anomaly-based intrusion detection, although less
favorable in IT environments due to intolerably high false-positive
rates, proves more adequate for ICS environments by virtue of their
highly regular behavior.
In industrial control systems, anomaly-based intrusion detection
can be performed in two different layers: the IT layer consist-
ing of supervisory and monitoring information systems, and the
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physical layer where sensors, actuators, and controllers collectively
control a physical process. Solely monitoring the IT layer for
attack-indicating anomalies is problematic because of the fact that
completely normal-looking traffic packets may still violate the se-
mantics of the communication protocol at the payload level and
deliver process data designed by the attacker to drive the process
to an unsafe state [15]. Therefore, a holistic approach to detecting
attacks on ICS requires a complementary more in-depth monitoring
mechanism capable of detecting attacks at the process level as an
advanced line of defense.
A process-level attack-detection mechanism monitors process
data, such as sensor measurements and control commands, to detect
misbehaviors in the physical process. The machine-to-machine
communication in ICS process networks produces traffic that is
highly deterministic, thereby enabling data-driven methods as a
viable approach to attack-detection in these environments. The
process-level attack-detection approach is particularly motivated
by the regularity of ICS behavior, which is a distinctive feature
that enables reliably constructing a baseline from historical process
measurements and subsequently detecting deviant behavior due to
anomalous operation.
1.5.2 Research Challenges
When it comes to equipping ICS with intrusion detection capabili-
ties, there are several challenges to consider.
First, ICS are heterogeneous systems with complex architecture
that often lack detailed specifications, hence creating a model of a
system is in most cases a tremendous task that is hardly feasible in
practice.
Second, process variables by their nature exhibit noisy behavior
due to, e.g., vibrations in sensing machinery, which is likely to
affect the detection accuracy of the employed detection mechanisms.
Therefore, it is imperative that the detection mechanisms are by
design insensitive to noise and that the assumption of noiseless
communication is dropped when developing these mechanisms.
Third, the diversity of industrial control systems and their
widely different application domains require the proposed attack-
detection mechanisms to be application-agnostic and to operate
independently of the underlying system specifications.
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Finally, when it comes to deploying process-level IDS research
prototypes in real environments, the fact that ICS incorporate both
IT technology and operation technology (OT) poses a hurdle to
designing and deploying security mechanisms that take both aspects
into account. As OT-based systems are increasingly adopting IT-
based solutions, the coordination between IT and OT personnel
proves essential for achieving the intended outcome. Furthermore,
the strict availability requirements of ICS necessitate the design of
lightweight mechanisms to ensure secure real-time operation.
1.5.3 Existing Solutions & Limitations
Most existing approaches to detecting misbehaviors in the physical
process propose the use of model-based techniques to model the
normal behavior of the process and then detect deviations there-
from [13, 17, 23–25]. While such approaches might prove viable
in some cases where a detailed and complete specification of the
physical process is at hand, in the real world, it is often the case
that the system to monitor is fairly complex and lacks a roadmap
to creating a model of the controlled process. Thus, building a
model of the physical process requires extensive human effort and
domain knowledge, if at all possible [14].
Another disadvantage of model-based techniques lies in the fact
that they involve solving a more general problem. Specifically,
after presumably modeling the normal behavior of the process, the
identified model is subsequently used to predict the future behavior
of the underlying system, which is then compared to the observed
behavior such that large deviations are labelled as potential attacks.
Predicting the future behavior based on historical data is a more
general problem than detecting misbehaviors, and it is known to be
difficult and prone to inaccuracies due to noise in the data. Finally,
since models are specific to the environments for which they were
identified, model-based techniques prove difficult to generalize.
Approaches that use machine learning and data mining have
been considered as well [12, 14, 26–30]. While machine learning
methods do not require a model of the physical process, they involve
a feature extraction and engineering phase, where system-dependent
features need to be selected for training. Feature selection is tricky,
hard to automate, and finding the best (most representative) fea-
tures require a great deal of tuning and cross-validation. Moreover,
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the fact that features are constructed by combining various process
variables and then transformed into high-dimensional feature spaces
makes it difficult to identify the whereabouts of the attack and
affects the interpretability of the detection results.
1.5.4 Departure-Based Attack Detection
Our proposed solution is model-free, meaning that rather than
creating a model to predict the future system behavior, pasad
directly compares the current behavior with the historical behavior
of the process to detect changes in dynamics.
With pasad, we introduce the notion of departure-based attack
detection where a departure is a specific type of anomaly that refers
to the process dynamics being forced to depart from the normal be-
havior due to potentially malicious structural changes in the stream
of sensor measurements. The normal behavior is established in an
oﬄine training phase through a mathematical construction that en-
ables the representation of the process dynamics in a noise-reduced
geometric space. Thereafter, to detect a departure in the process
behavior, pasad iteratively computes a departure score during an
online detection phase. Whenever this departure score crosses a
predetermined threshold, an alarm is raised to the operators.
1.6 Research Questions
This thesis identifies and contributes to the following research
questions.
RQ1: How to monitor industrial control systems at the physical pro-
cess level thereby promoting a suitable and tailored security
framework?
RQ2: How to achieve a detection approach that works across diverse
and proprietary cyber-physical systems?
RQ3: Are process-level solutions practical? To which extent are
they applicable? What are the nuts and bolts of deploying
such research techniques in practice?
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1.7 Contributions
We contribute to research questions RQ1 and RQ2 in Chapter 2
(Paper A), where we introduce pasad as a process-level attack-
detection mechanism and discuss how being a model-free technique
allows for handling diverse noisy ICS environments.
In Chapter 3 (Paper B), we address research question RQ3
by demonstrating the practicality of pasad and its deployability
in real industrial settings, where we describe our experience and
lessons learned from running a live monitoring experiment in a real
environment.
Following is a brief overview of the articles appended to this
thesis.
1.7.1 Paper A — Truth Will Out: Departure-Based
Process-Level Detection of Stealthy Attacks on
Control Systems
As a contribution to research questions RQ1 and RQ2, a novel ICS-
specific intrusion detection method (pasad) is introduced. Pasad
is an anomaly-based process-level intrusion detection system that
monitors ICS process activity in real time to determine whether
the system operation is normal or anomalous. Initially, pasad
learns the normal behavior recorded in a time series of sensor
measurements through a training phase, during which ideas from a
time-series analysis technique known as Singular Spectrum Analysis
are applied to extract signal information from process output under
normal conditions. Thereafter, the system continuously checks
if incoming observations are departing from the normal behavior
captured during the training phase.
Pasad is a theoretically sound, purely data-driven, lightweight,
model-free mechanism that requires no prior knowledge of the
system dynamics. Specifically, rather than creating a model of the
physical process to predict future system behavior, pasad seeks to
solve the easier problem of deciding whether present sensor readings
are departing from past readings due to a change in the mechanism
generating them.
Furthermore, by virtue of its impressive noise-reduction capabil-
ities, pasad is capable of detecting slight variations in the sensor
signal. This leads to the possibility of detecting strategic attackers
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who may try to hide their stealthy attacks even at the process level.
Finally, we show that pasad compares favourably with state-of-
the-art data-driven techniques and we demonstrate its effectiveness
using a simulation platform, data from a physical testbed, and data
from a real system.
1.7.2 Paper B — The Nuts and Bolts of Deploying
Process-Level IDS in Industrial Control Sys-
tems
The evaluation of ICS intrusion-detection methods in the literature
seems to have been restricted to simulations and oﬄine analysis of
relevant datasets. In an attempt to bridge the existing simulation-
based evaluation efforts with the real world by creating a roadmap
characterizing potential hurdles to be expected when bringing the
systems into a real environment, we take the evaluation of process-
level monitoring a step further by running a fully fledged prototype
in a real environment to examine the feasibility of the proposed
methods in real-world settings. We contribute to research question
RQ3 by building a complete system around pasad, deploying a
prototype in an operational paper factory, and describing our expe-
rience of running the prototype for 75 days. Finally, we highlight
some technical challenges and practical aspects of live process-level
monitoring for intrusions in ICS and then propose a set of guidelines
and recommendations for both security researchers and practition-
ers who may consider designing or deploying IDS solutions for
control systems.
1.8 Conclusions and Future Directions
Research on securing industrial control systems is gaining momen-
tum in light of the expanding attack surface fuelled by the surging
connectivity trend. Monitoring the process-level network for attack-
induced changes in dynamics has proven sensible and suitable for
these types of systems. This thesis highlighted the viability of
this approach and introduced a novel data-driven attack-detection
method that is efficient, theoretically sound, lightweight, and scal-
able. Furthermore, the practicality of the proposed system, and by
extension process-level intrusion detection systems, was scrutinized
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in real-world settings to investigate their applicability and better
understand deployment challenges.
Future work is set to focus on exploring other application areas
where pasad is likely to succeed, such as the vehicular domain and
power systems.
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